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Last week’s hostage crisis in Algeria, and the French military intervention in neighbouring
Mali, have focused attention on growing unrest in the Sahel region of North Africa. Susi
Dennison argues that although the threat posed by militant groups in Mali and Algeria was
well known prior to the crisis, EU member states had been unable to implement strong joint-
policies in the area. The incident has highlighted the need to strengthen the capabilities of
the European External Action Service, alongside the wider importance of European foreign
policy to the UK.
As the f ull results of  the hostage crisis at the In Amenas gas f ield unf olded over the weekend, and the
death toll climbed above 80, two key questions were lef t hanging. How do these dramatic events, which
suddenly brought Algeria back into mainstream news and appeared to take a number of  European
capitals by surprise, f it into the wider regional picture? Do they represent a shif t in the dynamics in the
region, and how will European countries respond to them?
Signers in Blood – the AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) linked terrorist group who took
responsibility f or the hostage taking – have stated that they did so in reprisal f or the French intervention
in neighbouring Mali. Although this sounds like a straightf orward reaction to recent events, implicit ly, this
motive conf irms two things. Firstly it indicates that (although their closeness with Al Qaeda may be
disputed) the terrorist networks involved in the siege at In Amenas, and indeed in the rebel groups
controlling swathes of  northern Mali, operate across borders.
Secondly, it conf irms the very basis f or
François Hollande’s decision 10 days
ago to send French troops into Mali:
the implications of  the Islamist
insurgency in northern Mali are not
national, nor even regional, but global.
The French government showed by
their intervention they were very much
aware of  this threat, as did the UK,
Belgium and Denmark in their decision
to send equipment to support the
French troops at the outset. The US
government had been concerned about
the situation in northern Mali f or the
last year too, and through autumn
2012 had ratcheted up ef f orts to
improve the prospects f or an Af rican
led, UN mandated  intervention, with
Hillary Clinton visit ing Algiers on this matter in October last year. The Algerian government were also alive
to the risks, although their reaction was by contrast to the European one, one of  caution around
intervention, even though they did allow the French to use their airspace to f acilitate operations.
Clearly then, although the key actors were taken aback by the speed and f erocity of  the hostage taking
in southern Algeria, they were well aware of  the threat f rom the groups involved and of  the international
nature of  that threat. The question then becomes why the Sahel region, which posed a collective
strategic threat to European countries, had not until now been approached in a more coherent way. In
ref erence to Algerian leadership and decision-making on breaking into In Amenas, François Hollande
argued that the Algerian military was capable of  ‘the most adapted response to the crisis’. France’s
f oreign minister Laurent Fabius said that “The Algerians know at what point terrorism is an absolute evil”
because of  their experience in combatting violent Islamist groups (f rom which the groups currently
operating in northern Mali developed) during their decade long internal armed conf lict in the 1990s.
Why then, have European states themselves not invested in developing a cohesive approach to a region
of  such strategic, geographical and energy importance, based on a greater understanding of  the Islamist
networks operating there? A lack of  developed structures to spearhead such an approach appears to be
one of  the crit ical issues. The EU Sahel strategy, which was launched in the second half  of  2011 aimed
to f ill the policy gap, but it has f ailed to have much of  an impact as the level of  implementation has been
low. At the end of  2012, a joint communication on an EU Strategy towards the Maghreb was released
af ter much delay. But again, this seems unlikely to deliver a more joined-up approach to security,
development and polit ical relationships in the region, because these dif f erent aspects of  EU policy are
led by dif f erent parts of  the EU architecture and are not well co-ordinated.
The European External Action Service (EEAS), which will undergo an of f icial review in 2013, was intended
to bridge some of  these divides between dif f erent areas of  European f oreign policy making. But the
EEAS has so f ar been unable to do much more than the structures which preceded it in bringing together
these dif f erent silos of  the EU’s external policy – and in particular bringing together def ence and crisis
management with more classical diplomacy in the Sahel region.
One concrete piece of  EU action is the planned training mission f or Malian troops, EUTM Mali. This has
been under discussion f or a number of  months, but since the Islamist rebel groups’ movement towards
the south ten days ago, preparations have gathered momentum. At last Thursday’s meeting of  the
Foreign Af f airs Council, more details emerged, including the appointment of  French General Francois
Lecointre as mission commander, and an aspiration f or the mission to be on the ground in Bamako by
mid-February. However with the situation developing so quickly on the ground now – reports emerged of
French and Malian troops retaking Diabaly and Douentza in central Mali on Monday evening – it is now
unclear exactly what role this training mission will play in a month’s t ime.
Ultimately, EU member states have not invested the requisite power in the EEAS and EU institutions to
allow them to lead an approach to the region. European power in the region still lies in the national
capitals, and since ef f orts have not been well co-ordinated, their impact has under-reached. In this
sense, the way in which the In Amenas incident impacts upon the af f ected countries’ involvement in the
conf lict and post-conf lict rebuilding in Mali will be crit ical. David Cameron, in his response on Sunday to
the lives lost as part of  the hostage rescue, said that responding to a terrorist activity emanating f rom
this region required iron resolve, over “years, even decades, rather than months”. The question of  what
exactly this iron resolve will entail is lef t open f or now, but it seems likely that f or Britain (and indeed the
US) this will be greater engagement at the level of  intelligence and strategy rather than military
involvement. Britain is likely to want to ally itself  closely with a broader European ef f ort, drawing on key
alliances with security powers in the region such as Algeria. At just the moment that the UK government
appears to be reconsidering its relationship with the EU, the situation has evolved in the Sahel to lay
bare the importance of  European f oreign policy to the UK.
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